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Abstract 
The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations was suspended for almost six months in 
2006. The purpose of this paper is to ask what scholars can learn about the political economy 
of reciprocal trade liberalisation from this suspension. Specifically, four potential 
explanations for this suspension are examined and, in turn, these suggest a number of 
questions that researchers and interested analysts may wish to pursue in the future. 
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I.  WHAT CAN RESEARCHERS LEARN FROM THE SUSPENSION OF 
THE DOHA ROUND NEGOTIATIONS IN 2006? 
 






Multilateral trade rounds have afforded scholars opportunities to learn more about the 
politics and economics of reciprocal trade liberalization. The Uruguay Round, for example, is 
of particular interest as it saw a broadening of corporate support within industrialized 
countries for multilateral trade reform (with the inclusion of binding disciplines on services 
and intellectual property rights drawing in support of financial, telecommunications and 
pharmaceutical companies for this Round) as well as agreement by developing countries to 
take on greater multilateral disciplines as part of the Single Undertaking. Understanding how 
and why both of these outcomes occurred has provided plenty of grist for the academic mill. 
Looking over the events of recent years, a similar question arises as to what can be learnt 
about the political economy of reciprocal trade reform from the Doha Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations. 
 
This chapter focuses specifically on the events leading up to, and the aftermath of the 
formal suspension of the Doha Round in July 2006. As is well known, once it became clear in 
late July 2006 that trade ministers from Australia, Brazil, the European Union, India, Japan 
and the United States were unable to agree on a framework for agricultural trade reforms in 
the context of the Doha Round, WTO Director-General Mr. Pascal Lamy suspended 
negotiations and all associated work on the Doha Round. 
 
A number of rationales were advanced for the suspension. For some it was hoped that 
a pause or “breathing space” might allow negotiators time to reassess their positions. For 
others, the suspension raised the prospect of outright failure that, it was thought, might jolt the 
most senior national policy makers (not necessarily trade ministers, who were probably well 
aware of the seriousness of the negotiating impasse, but their bosses – prime ministers and 
presidents) into action. Peering over the cliff might provide a rude shock to those complacent 
about the likelihood and consequences of outright failure, or so the argument went. Advocates 
of the latter position were soon to be disappointed and, by the fourth quarter of 2006, there 
was considerable unease among trade negotiators in Geneva. “Not talking is getting us 
nowhere”, was how one ambassador to WTO put it. Informal consultations restarted and the 
suspension was formally declared at an end in December 2006. 
 
More generally, the fortunes of the Doha Round have oscillated since its formal 
launch in November 2001. (Arguably, this leaves aside the pre-launch dramas at Seattle in 
1999.) The desire by nations to demonstrate an enhanced commitment to cross-border 
cooperation in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States is widely 
credited with providing the necessary impetus behind the launch of the Doha Round. 
Unfortunately, the goodwill did not last long and was certainly perceptibly elusive at the next 
Ministerial Conference, held at Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003. That conference, like 
many of its predecessors, collapsed without agreement. A course correction, in the form of the 
so-called July 2004 package, was subsequently agreed, which provided some structure and a 
plan for completing the Round. Since then, each major deadline has been missed, and   4
attempts to finalize sufficient specifics for a deal on any of the major negotiating items 
(agriculture, industrial goods and services) has proved impossible. 
 
One factor that has injected a sense of urgency into the negotiations is the imminent 
expiration of the United States President's Trade Promotion Authority, which enables the 
President to submit to Congress trade agreements that, by and large, must be voted up or 
down without amendment. It is thought by many knowledgeable observers that it would be 
impossible for the United States to seek congressional ratification of any multilateral trade 
agreement without this procedure (the fear being that individual elected representatives would 
seek amendments to the enacting legislation that might effectively call for the renegotiation of 
the agreement with trading partners.) Given that the current Trade Promotion Authority 
expires on 30 June 2007,
1 and the impending United States presidential election in 2008, 
many trade negotiators and officials appear to be currently operating on the assumption that 
any Doha Round agreement reached by mid-2007 could form the basis of a United States 
Government request to Congress to extend Trade Promotion Authority for six months. This 
would allow a formal ratification vote on the Doha Round agreement to take place well before 
the 2008 election cycle intensifies. (It is taken as a given that trade reforms are not a vote 
winner in the United States, a presumption reinforced in the mid-term congressional elections 
of 2006.) 
 
Failure to complete the Doha Round by mid-2007 will have a number of consequences. 
First, given the United States’ presidential election cycle and the time taken to assemble a 
new American administration, the Doha Round could not be completed before mid-2009 at 
the earliest. A completion date of 2010 or 2011 is more realistic, especially since Congress 
will probably have to approve an extension of Trade Promotion Authority for the new 
president. (The conditions that Congress may attach to such an extension could also 
complicate any completion of the Doha Round.) Second, it is unclear how this two-to-four 
year delay will be used. Will the absence of any deadlines reduce the pressure on negotiators 
to come to an agreement, or can negotiating scenarios and options be fruitfully explored in a 
less heightened atmosphere? Perhaps more importantly, will the priorities of WTO members 
change much in the next two to three years? If so, how? If not, will the impasse continue or 
will flexibility emerge? Indeed, one might ask what the tangible difference is between several 
years of drifting and declaring outright failure, especially as many senior political leaders will 
probably equate one with the other. Fortunately, the lot of a researcher is not to confront these 
difficult policy-making questions; even so, it is worth bearing them in mind as one considers 
what lessons can be learned from the suspension of the Doha Round. As is often the case, 
tomorrow's decisions and turn of events are often influenced by today's circumstances. 
 
A few other preliminary comments are in order before proceeding further. First, it will 
be necessary to draw on the events from the launch of the Doha Round in November 2001 
until the end of the suspension of the Round in December 2006. Second, specific focus will be 
on the factors leading to the suspension of the Doha Round in July 2006. In this regard, four 
non-mutually exclusive hypotheses are stated and examined. Third, it must be noted that 
opinions have inevitably differed sharply as to whom or what was responsible for the 
                                                           
1 During 2006, the approaching expiration of Trade Promotion Authority was a reason given by many senior 
trade negotiators for making progress before the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December of 2005. As 
2006 progressed, the expected date of a “breakthrough” slipped further and further back. When no such 
breakthrough transpired at the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, negotiators then began hoping for a deal 
before the end of March 2007. When that proved impossible, negotiators began discussing the need for a short 
extension of Trade Promotion Authority in 2007 in order to ratify an agreement they expect to complete in mid-
2007.   5
negotiating impasse in July 2006, just as there was considerable acrimony after the collapse of 
the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003. 
 
Fourth, the four hypotheses advanced here have been presented by the author at 
conferences and workshops in East Asia, North America, and Europe and, for what it is worth, 
a number of participants (many of whom are much closer than the author to the trade 
negotiations) have argued that they contain several kernels of truth. Therefore, it is hoped that 
by probing a little deeper into each of these four hypotheses in this chapter, some of the 
assumptions made by scholars in thinking through the politics and economics of reciprocal 
trade liberalization will be called into question and that in rethinking them, our understanding 
of the associated matters might improve. 
 
Section A of this chapter describes five of the distinctive features of the Doha Round, 
whose relevance will become clearer as the argument progresses. The four hypotheses 
concerning the suspension of the Doha Round are described in section B together with some 
of the implications raised by them. Section C probes some of the research questions raised by 
the four hypotheses and section D offers some concluding remarks. 
 
A.  Five distinctive features of the Doha Round 
 
Although the introduction to this chapter contains some remarks on the sequence of 
negotiations in the Doha Round, this multilateral trade round has a number of other distinctive 
features that are likely to be of some relevance to discussions on the political economy of 
reciprocal trade reform. Having said that, it should be noted that the length of the Doha Round, 
the propensity to miss deadlines, and failed ministerial meetings are not unique to this 
multilateral trade round. It is other aspects of the Doha Round that are discussed below. 
 
First, the prominence given to development matters in this multilateral trade round is 
distinctive. Previous rounds have sought “only” to liberalize trade barriers, enhance 
transparency and the like – all of which may, in fact, facilitate development. However, never 
before have development considerations been so centrally placed in a multilateral trade round. 
It may well be that the rationale for this move was to secure support from developing 
countries for launching the Doha Round in 2001. Whatever the rationale, the form of the 
development mandate, as it is so often described, has never been precisely defined. Does it 
refer to a set of principles, means or ends? Certainly, diplomats and others can point to 
documents that refer to development-related aspects of the Doha Round, but it is not clear 
whether these documents really summarize a consensus view as to what constitutes the 
development mandate. Arguably not. Indeed, one might argue that the development mandate 
has deliberately been kept sufficiently ambiguous to allow its beneficiaries (developing 
countries) to redefine it at will as well as to suit whatever matter is at hand. One important 
consequence of the adoption of this mandate is that it has called into question exactly whose 
interests are served, and how, by the Doha Round negotiations. One traditional direct 
beneficiary, export interests, may now wonder what their stake has become in a development-
oriented WTO. (Indeed, some leading lobbyists have noted a reluctance of senior corporate 
executives to attend recent WTO Ministerial Conferences, apparently because of confusion 
created by the development label of the Round.) 
 
On the other hand, more developing country governments, non-governmental 
organizations, and other institutions may feel they have a greater stake in a round with a 
development mandate, which could be healthy for the long-term reputation and functioning of 
WTO. In short, the articulated goals of the Doha Round are likely to influence those who have   6
a stake in the negotiations as well as the intensity with which they pursue their interests, 
factors that any political economy analysis of reciprocal trade liberalization should take into 
account. 
 
The second distinctive feature has been the demise of what might be termed the 
bipolar WTO and its replacement by a multipolar alternative. A recent paper (Evenett, 2007) 
describes the factors that led to the end of United States and European domination of the 
multilateral trading system and the determination of Brazil, China and India (admittedly, in 
different ways) to influence the evolution of WTO. The associated transition is by no means 
complete; even so, some elements of the new WTO landscape can be clearly discerned. The 
United States and the European Union may no longer be able to present proposals fait 
accompli to the rest of the WTO membership, but they are still large enough to veto proposals. 
The implications of a multipolar WTO for agenda setting, coalition formation, securing 
agreement and enforcement of accords have yet to be fully considered, and may come to 
occupy the time of many researchers in the years to come. 
 
The third development in the Doha Round was the repudiation by many WTO 
members, principally the developing countries, of proposals for new multilateral rules or 
disciplines in a number of regulatory areas. Even though negotiations on further rules 
concerning trade facilitation were to begin later, it is worth bearing in mind that the African 
bloc of developing countries objected to launching negotiations on all four of the so-called 
Singapore Issues. (The four matters being the relationship between trade and competition law 
and policy, investment policy disciplines, transparency in public procurement practices, and 
trade facilitation.) 
 
A number of interesting questions were raised by this third development. However, in 
order not to drift too far from the theme of this chapter, the focus here is on only a few of 
them. Much turns on how to interpret this rejection to negotiate on Singapore Issues. Was it a 
step taken to trim the negotiating agenda of items thought likely to divert developing country 
energies from pursuing their true interests? Or, did the rejection reflect careful consideration 
of each of the four Singapore Issues and the conclusion that none was appropriate for 
multilateral disciplines? From the perspective of the political economy support for trade 
reform, questions arose as to which interests might be served by multilateral initiatives in 
these areas and whether they could effectively organize themselves nationally and 
internationally. Although consumers, for example, may well benefit from certain multilateral 
disciplines on competition law, will they bear the costs of collective action? If they do not, 
who, if anyone, will do so? Moreover, is the political economy of implementing a rule or law 
– which can be a discrete, irreversible act – the same as liberalizing a trade barrier, which can 
take many values and be reduced in stages? The final point to be made in connection with the 
Singapore Issues is that, having swept three of them off the negotiating table in 2004, they 
cannot be held responsible for the impasse that followed.
2 Instead, the impasse arose over 
what might be called the traditional liberalization function of WTO, particularly in this case as 
it refers to agricultural trade reform.  
 
                                                           
2  There are two quite different caveats here. For completeness sake, they are stated by the author without 
endorsement. The first is that one could argue that by serving as a distraction for almost eight years, the 
Singapore Issues used up time and energy that could been used productively elsewhere. The second is that, 
without the Singapore Issues, the European Union would have little to show for any concessions that it might 
make on agricultural trade reforms and other matters.   7
The sustained focus by many WTO members, both developing and industrialized, on 
agricultural trade reform (in all of its forms
3) is the fourth distinctive feature of the Doha 
Round. Certainly, an Agreement on Agriculture was negotiated during the Uruguay Round, 
but this was regarded as a prelude to something more – the more being the next multilateral 
trade negotiation, the Doha Round. There are, without doubt, some (but not very many) WTO 
members for whom existing trade-distorting agricultural policies significantly harm their 
economies or their export interests, a fact that may account for the attention given by those 
WTO members to this matter. However, it must also be said that a balanced assessment must 
point out two countervailing factors. 
 
The first factor is that some WTO members' consumers (particularly those in North 
Africa and the Middle East, it seems) benefit from the agricultural subsidies that depress the 
world prices of certain foodstuffs. Many studies have found that eliminating agricultural 
export subsidies would have a small net effect on the world economy, which in turn raises the 
question of whether any measures to reduce agricultural export subsidies ought to be coupled 
with transfers to those harmed by this initiative. 
 
The second factor is that the overall benefits of agricultural trade reform are typically 
found to be a fraction of those associated with liberalization of national service sectors. A 
better understanding of the factors responsible for the prominence given to agriculture, and 
the reluctance of many WTO members to seriously discuss service sector liberalization, 
would shed light on one important aspect of the trajectory followed during the Doha Round. If 
it is the case that the reluctance to liberalize service sectors, in the context of WTO, is the 
result of (a) prior adverse experiences with unilateral service sector reform, or (b) such 
reforms being a condition of IMF or World Bank “rescue” packages, then we might learn 
something about the spillovers from development policy-making to WTO. 
 
More generally, whether it be with regard to the Singapore Issues, agricultural trade 
reform or the service sector negotiations, more light could be shed on the influencing factors 
and the processes used by countries in determining national negotiating priorities. 
 
The legacy of the Uruguay Round, both good and bad, provides the final distinctive 
feature of the Doha Round. On (what at first appears to be) the positive side, the Marrakech 
Agreement clarified and distinguished between the different functions of WTO. These 
functions include, among others, negotiation and dispute settlement. These two functions can, 
in principle, operate independently of one another.
4 This separation of functions does not 
appear to be lost on those WTO members who are not keen on further multilateral trade 
reform (at least on the terms offered by their trading partners.) To some, this may have raised 
the possibility that a failed Doha Round negotiation need not necessarily imply the end of 
WTO. Based on this logic, the prevailing WTO agreements and the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding would remain in place even if the Doha Round negotiations fail to reach a 
successful conclusion. As argued in section B, this factor may have influenced the 
calculations by key actors as to the cost of suspension and failure of the Doha Round.  
 
The negative legacy of the Uruguay Round is the enduring perception among many 
developing country delegations that at Marrakech they agreed to a one-sided deal. Fears have 
been expressed that the cost of implementing certain Uruguay Round agreements cut too 
                                                           
3 Market access, export subsidies and domestic support payments. 
4 Whether this is desirable, however, is another matter.   8
much into any gains for developing countries.
5 Moreover, some of the high-profile benefits of 
the Uruguay Round for developing countries, such as the liberalization of trade in textiles and 
clothing, were backloaded and did not occur until almost 10 years after WTO came into being. 
An imbalance between the timing of costs and benefits, then, is said to have occurred. The 
perceived inequity of the Uruguay Round is very much an empirical question, and 13 years 
after the signing of the Marrakech Agreement one would have thought plenty of data would 
be available for conducting serious ex post assessments of the Uruguay Round.  
 
Whatever the merits of received wisdom, the perceived inequity appears to have 
coloured the negotiating strategies of many developing countries, particularly the least 
developing countries (LDCs) and the lower-income developing countries. For example, it is 
not surprising that some developing countries opposed the Singapore Issues because of fears 
over their implementation costs, especially as certain international organizations — including 
the World Bank, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) — were fostering these fears at the 
time.) More generally, some Geneva-based trade observers have argued that 90-100 WTO 
members, principally poorer developing countries, would be delighted to see the Doha Round 
fail. Accounting for this level of disenchantment with the multilateral trade reform ought to be 
a priority for research over the years to come, especially for an institution such as WTO, 
where each member has, in principle, a veto.  
 
The purpose of this section has been to identify five distinctive features of the Doha 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations and some of the research questions that they raise.  
Raising them should not been viewed as a suggestion that no one else has thought about these 
matters; rather, the objective has been to identify areas where additional research would 
possibly be especially helpful. These five factors provide much of the context for the 
following account of the four potential hypotheses accounting for the suspension of the Doha 
Round in 2006. 
 
B.  Four working hypotheses on the suspension of the Doha Round 
 
To fix ideas as to what research questions arise from the suspension of the Doha 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations, it may be useful to posit four working hypotheses. 
This will make it possible to take into account several different aspects of the political 
economy and the mechanics of multilateral trade reform, and, hopefully, will help the reader 
assess the pros and cons of each hypothesis. It should also be noted that these four hypotheses 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive and that a combination of them, plus other factors, may 
well best account for the suspension of the Doha Round in July 2006. The four working 
hypotheses, which are subsequently discussed, are: 
(a) Perceived low costs of suspension – even of outright failure – of the Doha Round; 
(b)  Domestic political constraints in certain leading WTO members lead to 
incompatible levels of ambition in liberalizing agricultural trade; 
(c) The organization and procedures used during the negotiations among the WTO 
membership were flawed; 
(d) Negotiating miscalculations were responsible for the impasse. 
 
                                                           
5 This view is stated without the endorsement of the author who, like many other experts, remains sceptical of 
the evidence presented in support of this argument.   9
Four somewhat related factors underlie the first hypothesis. The fact that there has 
been so much unilateral liberalization of trade barriers by developing countries and, to a lesser 
extent, of agricultural policies by certain industrialized countries (in particular, the European 
Union), plus the fact that more such liberalization is either planned or likely to occur, may 
well have led to the impression that national commercial interests will be well served in the 
years to come, even without a Doha Round deal. The wave of regional trade agreements 
signed in recent years also reinforces the impression that there is a trade liberalization 
alternative to WTO. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, according the WTO statistics on national 
exports, every major player (with the exception of Japan and the United States) or group of 
players (such as LDCs) in the Doha Round has seen its exports grow by approximately 10 per 
cent or more per annum since 2000. 
 
The final factor in support of the first hypothesis, which was mentioned in the 
previous section, is that WTO members appear to have differentiated between the 
liberalization function of WTO and the existing WTO agreements, and the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, which, in principle, exists to encourage compliance with the latter. Taken 
together, these factors suggest that the prospects for export growth will continue to be good 
and that the threat to existing privileges of a Doha Round suspension or even failure is limited. 
Moreover, to the extent that concluding the Doha Round on relatively unambitious terms 
means export growth would accelerate by a mere 1 or 2 percentage points per annum, given 
the high levels of existing export growth one can imagine a jaded and mercantilistic trade 
minister asking whether the incremental payoff from concluding the Doha Round would be 
large enough. (Of course, the retort should be that the minister needs to negotiate a more 
ambitious deal.) 
 
Whether the costs of outright failure of the Doha Round are as low as suspension is 
another matter.
6 Much presumably turns on the metrics employed and the timeframe. From a 
longer-term systemic perspective, it is difficult to see how an acknowledged failure to 
complete the Doha Round would be a plus for the reputation of WTO.
7 However,  much 
depends on the alternative. If it is a never-ending acrimonious negotiation that saps the will of 
all concerned, thus perpetuating and adding to a negative impression of the world trading 
system, then calls to halt the Doha Round negotiations might not look so unappealing. In 
these circumstances, damage limitation may become the primary consideration rather than 
potential for liberalizing progress. The prospect of continuing buoyant export growth may 
also cushion the downside of any decision to abandon the Doha Round negotiations. 
 
The second hypothesis relates, superficially at least, to the subject over which the 
impasse was reached in July 2006, namely, agriculture. No overlap was found in the 
acceptable levels of ambition for liberalizing the various policies that support and protect 
farmers. The European Union trade negotiators clung tenaciously to the 10-year programme 
of reforms that its member States agreed to in 2003 and refused to cut, among other policies, 
its agricultural tariffs at a faster pace. Demands that the United States cut its financial support 
to farmers were rebuffed unless greater market access improvements in agriculture were 
offered by the trading partners of the United States. In fact, the United States proposed a very 
                                                           
6 Indeed, whether the costs of suspension have been accurately assessed is another matter which is considered 
further in  section C of this chapter. 
7 However, the argument exists that by acknowledging failure, the decks can be cleared, so to speak, and any 
future multilateral negotiation may be less encumbered with the baggage of the Doha Round. Whether every 
WTO member will see the matter that way, should these events come to pass, is probably doubtful. Will every 
WTO member resist the temptation to claim that they have unaddressed grievances from the Doha Round and 
that certain “promises” made to them were broken etc?   10
ambitious liberalization package for agriculture precisely to balance what it perceived as its 
losses on domestic support with gains on foreign market access.
8 India and China both argued 
that they had little or no room to cut farm tariffs, lest they jeopardize the wellbeing of their 
rural populations, which are numbered in the hundreds of millions. The preconditions for a 
standoff were in place, with the United States eventually being isolated as the party making 
the least mainstream demands. 
 
The mismatch in ambition begs the following question: why was domestic opposition 
to further agricultural concessions hard to overcome? Was it because political leaders saw few 
competing domestic interests clamouring for trade reforms to economies abroad and, 
therefore, in political terms saw little to offset the “pain” of agricultural trade reform? This, of 
course, pushes the question back further. What accounts for the limited support for further 
foreign market opening? Here the answer could be a combination of factors, including some 
of those mentioned above (such as already buoyant levels of export growth as well as plenty 
of ongoing unilateral and regional trade reforms.) Other contributing factors might be that: 
(a) The quality of offers to liberalize national service sectors was generally poor; 
(b) The terms upon which trade in goods was to be liberalized remained unclear, 
especially as it related to the exemption to be allowed; and  
(c) Corporate interests may well have factored in any planned liberalization by trading 
partners and may not see any Doha Round reforms going beyond the planned 
liberalization. 
 
With regard to factor (c), there appears to be a marked reluctance by trading partners 
to “pay” for agricultural reforms that jurisdictions, such as the European Union, are 
undertaking. These trading partners may have decided to wait for better commercial 
opportunities in agriculture to unfold as reforms abroad are implemented. This discussion will 
return later to the complications created by unilateral liberalization when negotiating 
reciprocal cuts in bound tariffs and other policy instruments. Implicit in the argument above, 
of course, is that actual, and not bound, market access improvements are what appear to 
galvanize export interests. 
 
The third hypothesis refers to the terms upon which the recent negotiations were 
conducted among the WTO membership. As is well known, the conundrum faced is as 
follows. Each WTO member has, in principle, a veto over the outcome of any negotiation – 
but with 150 members and at least three substantive areas of negotiation to consider (goods, 
agricultural and service sector matters) it is impossible for everyone to negotiate all three 
matters together. Inevitably, some classification or segmentation of WTO membership into 
groups (even groups of one) occurs. Moreover, some WTO members may take the lead in 
negotiating the parameters of an agreement that could then be presented to the other members. 
This raises concerns about inclusivism and suspicions that subsets of the WTO membership 
will make deals among each other at the expense of other members. Given the negative view 
that some have of the Uruguay Round agreement, these concerns are not to be underestimated. 
 
In the run-up to the July 2006 suspension, the following formulation was adopted to 
advance the negotiations: six significant WTO members (Australia, Brazil, the European 
Union, India, Japan and the United States), each represented by their trade ministers or 
                                                           
8 The United States sought to balance its losses in agriculture within the same sector – and not across sectors. It 
may be recalled that it is precisely the willingness of nations to make intersectoral trade-offs which many argue 
is one of the advantages of reciprocal trade liberalization. The fact that the United States’ agricultural interests 
consistently insisted on intrasectoral benefits for any losses is somewhat revealing.   11
equivalent, attempted to negotiate the parameters of the overall package of agricultural, non-
agricultural and service sector reforms. Typically, each of the three main topics for 
negotiation were taken in turn, but it was understood that “nothing was decided until 
everything was decided” (a consequence of adhering to the Single Undertaking). WTO 
Director-General Mr. Lamy floated the so-called 20-20-20 proposal in the first half of 2006 as 
a possible set of parameters around which a final Doha Round agreement might coalesce. This 
involved a cap of US$ 20 billion on direct agricultural subsidies by the United States, 
acceptance of the G20 proposal for cutting agricultural tariffs (which envisaged 
approximately a 54 per cent cut in tariffs on imported agricultural products), and a maximum 
ad valorem tariff of 20 per cent on imports of goods by developing countries. 
 
As we now know, this scheme for organizing the negotiations did not bear fruit and, of 
course, the question is why? Perhaps even with only six parties, as opposed to the two parties 
that essentially negotiated the central elements of the Uruguay Round, it was feared that each 
concession was likely to be “pocketed” and, therefore, not reciprocated by the other five 
members of this inner group. There may also have been idiosyncratic factors that slowed this 
process down, such as the appointment of a new United States Trade Representative in early 
2006. (Realistically, new United States Trade Representatives cannot be seen at home to be 
making concessions during their first meeting with foreign counterparts.) Even so, once it 
became clear that not enough movement was forthcoming, negotiating positions hardened. 
 
The extent to which the negotiating procedure was really at fault can be questioned, 
especially if one believes the second hypothesis outlined above and that, on agricultural 
matters, some leading WTO members had little room to make further concessions. Even so, 
questions still arise as to whether the 20-20-20 package was the right formulation, whether 
that process and package took sufficient account of the concerns of other WTO members 
(especially the poorer and smaller developing countries), and whether more progress could 
have been made at the level of ambassadors in Geneva before the matters were taken up by 
trade ministers? It is not being suggested here that there are straightforward answers to these 
questions; the intention is merely to highlight the fact that there were alternatives to what 
some have dubbed the “Masters of the Universe” model of multilateral trade negotiations. 
 
The fourth hypothesis points to the role of negotiating miscalculations, if not 
necessarily as a reason for the ultimate impasse but at least as an explanation as to why 
precious time was lost. Throughout the Doha Round, much has been made of the need to keep 
pressure on the United States and the European Union to make more concessions, in particular 
on agricultural policies, as if it were just a matter of persistence before the supporters of those 
policies in the West would throw in the towel. This is not a matter of whether the European 
Union or the United States should make more concessions (in fact, they should). It is whether 
influential domestic interests in these jurisdictions will let their trade negotiators move and 
whether enough pressure could sway the influence of those interests. Presumably, senior trade 
negotiators have to judge how far their foreign counterparts can feasibly go, given domestic 
political constraints, and what, if anything, foreign offers of market access and the like can do 
to bolster opponents to import-competing sectors in trading partners. Elsewhere (Evenett, 
2006), the author argued, on the basis of specialized press reports at the time, that in 2005 
some of the European Union's trading partners underestimated the strength of the opposition 
among European Union member States to further agricultural concessions. That opposition 
was led by France and included a majority of the then 25 European Union member States. 
 
Likewise, the level of support in the United States Congress for the current set of 
United States farm subsidies is very high, reflecting their popularity among United States   12
farmers and ranchers. This is despite a concerted effort by the United States Administration to 
persuade the country’s farmers and elected officials that the current farm subsidies are 
financially unsustainable and likely to be challenged as WTO-illegal. In the light of these 
considerations, one has to wonder if the European Union and United States trading partners 
applied the right level and right form of pressure. Perhaps less emphasis on moral suasion and 
more on signals to move further on goods and service sector reforms might have galvanized 
wider export interests in these industrialized countries. One way or the other, individually and 
collectively, the negotiating offers did not trigger enough support to overcome entrenched 
supporters of the status quo. 
 
Another factor that may have reduced the incentive to accurately assess each trading 
partner's so-called bottom lines for these negotiations is the view, voiced by a number of 
supporters of WTO, that somehow “everything will be all right on the night” and that enough 
WTO members care about “saving the system”. These are two different views, the first 
appealing to luck perhaps, and the second to basic instincts to support multilateral rules. Both 
views, however, may well have accentuated the negotiating miscalculations associated with 
the fourth hypothesis, and overlooked the hard-nosed calculations associated with the first and 
second hypotheses described above. 
 
 The four hypotheses described in this section could, individually or combined, partly 
account for the suspension of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The 
objective of section C is to describe a number of research questions raised by these four 
hypotheses and the suspension itself.  
 
C.  Research questions arising from suspension of the Doha Round in 2006 
 
One approach to assessing the suspension of the Doha Round is to ask whether it 
raises any fundamental questions about our current understanding of the politics and 
economics of trade policy formation and reciprocal trade liberalization. Implicitly or 
explicitly, most economic analyses of trade policy formation have self-interested political 
leaders aggregate (in some fashion) the preferences of various organized and unorganized 
groups of society, typically with the former getting a larger weight than the latter.
9 The 
willingness of those groups to lobby their governments depends on a number of factors, 
including the perceived gains or losses from various choices, the lobbying efforts of others 
and the costs of collective action. The beauty of this approach to studying trade policy 
formation is that it neatly identifies and clarifies some of the trade-offs facing self-interested 
politicians. What is interesting here is how applicable this conception of trade policy 
formation is when applied to the specific circumstances of reciprocal trade liberalization in 
the context of WTO. The fact that this conception may not be entirely accurate does not imply 
that it should be rejected out of hand, but rather that refinements and reformulations may be in 
order. 
 
The first hypothesis described in the previous section essentially argues that the 
perceived cost of the Doha Round suspension is low. This raises questions as to how self-
interested politicians assess the costs to their national interests of a suspension of the Round 
and whether that assessment is accurate. Have all of the relevant costs been identified, 
especially if there is the belief that the end of negotiations will be followed by more dispute 
settlement cases and by more trade remedy actions (such as antidumping, countervailing 
duties and safeguard measures)? By what process are these costs identified and assessed? To 
                                                           
9 An example of this approach is the much studied paper by G. Grossman and E. Helpman, 1994.    13
what extent are these costs discounted by the fact that they might not, in fact, happen? Here, 
both empirical and qualitative research might shed light on the restraining effect, if any, that 
ongoing multilateral trade talks have on international trade disputes as well as identify errors 
in decision-making that do not consider the absence of this restraint. Of course, the 
explanation for the perceived costs being seen as so low is that the political costs are likely to 
be faced by the successor to a current trade minister. Even so, it would be useful to test this 
simple hypothesis against more sophisticated alternatives, taking into account any 




Perhaps far more under-appreciated is the possible impact that sustained unilateral and 
preferential trade liberalization might have had on the costs of suspension or failure of the 
multilateral trade negotiations. During the past 20 years, many developing countries (and 
some industrialized countries) have liberalized their trade regimes significantly, resulting in a 
growing gap between the measures bound in the relevant WTO agreements and the measures 
applied. It is argued here that this growing gap might have implications for the political 
economy of reciprocal trade liberalization at WTO and which require more thought and 
attention. 
 
The bound level of a trade measure is, of course, the currency of WTO trade 
negotiations; this is because such bindings are thought to provide certainty concerning the 
nature of the (most adverse) treatment of a foreign product, service or supplier. Reductions in 
bound rates, therefore, are said to have value to foreign firms in so far as they reduce 
uncertainty about their potential treatment. When bound tariffs equal or just exceed applied 
tariff rates, a multilateral trade agreement to cut bound tariff rates is almost certain to also 
require cuts in applied tariff rates; the latter reduces the cost of supplying a given market, 
thereby creating commercial opportunities for foreign firms. It is precisely the quest for those 
commercial opportunities that encourages foreign trade partners to offer reciprocal 
concessions of their own. The question posed here is whether private parties do, in fact, view 
the benefits of cutting bound tariff rates in the manner described above. 
 
First, the value of a bound tariff rate depends in large part on the probability that 
foreign private parties place on the liberalizing government reversing its reforms. Much, of 
course, depends on the political economy of the liberalization programme in the reforming 
country. If this probability is thought by foreign firms to be low, then the value of lowering a 
binding on tariffs that does not result in cuts in applied rates is likely to be low as well. This 
implies that, as time passes and the gap between bound and applied rates grows because of 
unilateral trade reforms, only larger and larger cuts in bound rates (necessary to cut the 
applied rates in foreign markets) will be enough to encourage exporters to actively support 
their government's negotiating position at WTO. 
 
Following this argument, the degree of exporter support for multilateral trade reform is 
a function of the prior extent of unilateral trade reform abroad; where the latter has been 
extensive, a minimum level of bound tariff rate reduction may be necessary to garner any 
active corporate support at all. These are (hopefully intelligent) conjectures and it would be 




10 To the extent that average tenure of a minister is an endogenous variable, the slow-changing or never-changing 
institutional features that partially determine tenure may be more useful in identifying variables.   14
One reason why WTO members may be unwilling to “pay” for the unilateral reforms 
or each other's agricultural policies is the presumption that it is irreversible budgetary 
pressures that are driving reforms and, therefore, backsliding is very unlikely. Whether or not 
this argument is true depends very much on the context and countries being considered; yet, it 
does suggest that bindings may have less of a role in certain situations — in which case, the 
balance of concessions and even the content
11 of a multilateral deal will have to reflect this. 
 
A third reason why bindings might be less important than is typically thought is 
because there are number of WTO-legal measures for effectively circumventing them (and 
thereby imposing higher tariffs on imports). Exporters know this, and thus discount promises 
to cut bindings accordingly. For example, anti-dumping measures can be applied on top of 
MFN tariffs. As far as the calculus facing the exporter is concerned, much would depend on 
the difference in the magnitude of the MFN tariff and the expected antidumping tariffs
12 and 
the likelihood of the latter being imposed. To the extent that the enforcement of unfair trade 
laws is expected to become more rigorous after a multilateral trade deal is concluded (for 
some this is the quid pro quo for most favoured nation [MFN] tariff reduction in the first 
place), this will erode the net benefits to exporters with consequences for the overall level of 
support for the associated multilateral trade agreement. It would be useful to learn more about 
the potential dampening effect of the widespread use of trade remedy laws on corporate 
support for the reciprocal liberalization of trade in goods. 
 
Examining the true value of cutting bindings, especially to exporters of manufactured 
goods, may go some way to understanding what many perceive to be a low level of business 
support for the current trade round. Other factors could also be relevant, including any 
confusion created by the adoption of the development mandate. Moreover, the greater 
propensity of service sector firms to engage in high-profile lobbying during the Doha Round 
is worth exploring; however, the explanation here may well be that opposition to reforming 
their service sectors is so intense in many WTO members that an additional lobbying effort 
was thought necessary. 
 
Implicit in the second hypothesis is a statement about how national political systems 
aggregate across different corporate interests and the apparently substantial influence of 
defensive agricultural interests on national trade negotiating strategies. The explanation for 
this may be, as argued above, that many non-agricultural corporate interests see little benefit 
in the Doha Round's completion, at least on the terms being offered at present, and they do 
not lobby in the first place. 
 
However, there are perhaps alternative explanations. For example, do agricultural 
interests have a far more effective lobby because they focus on a smaller number of policy 
matters before politicians, and so can concentrate their lobbying efforts? Alternatively, is 
there something about the nature of the policy instruments being negotiated in agriculture that 
generates more intense lobbying pressure? For example, does the expected gain in overseas 
market access, necessary to compensate a farmer for a certain reduction in domestic support 
payments, have to be so much larger precisely because the former is speculative and the latter 
loss is certain? Finally, the allocation of seats in certain legislatures on a geographical, rather 
than a population basis may well reinforce the strength of the agricultural lobby (and, in fact, 
is said to do so precisely because of this reason in the United States Senate.) These matters, 
                                                           
11 That is, the desirability of including agricultural trade reforms at all. 
12 Given that average MFN tariff rates in many industrialized countries are a fifth or even a tenth of the height of 
the anti-dumping duties imposed, it therefore does not take a large increase in the probability of anti-dumping 
duties being imposed to overturn the benefit of any MFN tariff reduction.   15
and no doubt others, need further consideration if we are to understand better: the political 
economy of agricultural trade liberalization; the extent to which agricultural trade 
liberalization should be thought of in the same way as the liberalization of trade in goods; and, 
perhaps most importantly of all, and whether serious agricultural trade reform is possible 
within the context of multilateral trade agreements.
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The third hypothesis mentioned in the previous section, i.e., that the procedures and 
organization of the Doha Round negotiations were flawed, raises important questions about 
the nature of multilateral trade agreements and the mechanisms used to secure accords. At 
present, the challenge is to secure the agreement of all 150 WTO members, each of whom has 
a veto, on a Single Undertaking covering a diverse range of topics recognizing that, 
practically speaking, progress is likely to be made (at least, initially) among smaller groups of 
WTO members. The latter point implies the existence of a second stage to what might be 
termed the negotiating game, in which the whole WTO membership accepts, rejects or 
modifies any proposals negotiated in the first stage. Undoubtedly, those involved in the 
smaller group – or first stage – negotiations will take this second stage into account, a fact that 
may also have adverse implications. 
 
Given that concessions are associated with political “pain”, once a concession is 
offered it signals a willingness to accept a higher level of pain to secure an agreement. Even if 
a concession is subsequently withdrawn, the willingness and ability to go further is not 
forgotten. Perhaps as a result of this, but more generally because of the multi-step nature of 
the negotiation, WTO members will be reluctant to move first, as any overtures that they 
make may be rejected. However, the information revealed by the overture remains. These 
preliminary lines of argument suggest that, if WTO is effectively stuck with using multi-step 
negotiations, then we need to better understand the incentives created by the multiple steps. 
Here, game theory approaches to bargaining and the findings of studies of similar decision-
making challenges in organizations with large memberships might be of use. 
 
Alternatives to the current negotiating modalities could be considered further, which 
opens both narrow- and wide-ranging possibilities. Among the latter, the pros and cons of the 
Single Undertaking comprise a venerable research topic that still requires further attention. On 
what basis could different groups of WTO members proceed at different speeds without 
creating further discrimination within the multilateral trade system? In addition, to what 
extent does the answer to that question depend on the trade regulations being considered? 
Perhaps, more narrowly, we might ask whether there was an alternative to the “top down” 
negotiation of the framework of an agreement in 2006, which could have been pursued? 
Given the desire of many WTO members to secure exceptions from any framework 
agreement, to what extent can the parameters of such an accord be agreed upon without 
knowing the specifics of which exemptions are to be allowed?
14 Must uncertainty over the 
average level of cuts in tariffs (say) be resolved at the same time as the exceptions negotiated, 
or is a sequential approach possible? The pros and cons of the different alternatives to 
organizing negotiations and the incentives that they create for countries to liberalize their 
economies arguably need further thought. Certainly, this is an area where the professors need 
to catch up with the steps taken by the practitioners. 
                                                           
13  Perhaps the question could be put pointedly, thus: What is likely to lead to more agricultural reform – 
recurring domestic budgetary pressures or multilateral trade negotiations? 
14 In this regard, it is telling that during 2007, trade negotiators in Geneva began a “bottom up” assessment of 
each negotiating topic in order to establish the possible implications of the exemptions being sought. Surely, 
however, the number and nature of the exemptions sought will depend on the overall depth of liberalization, 
which are precisely the parameters that the “top down” approach, pursued in 2006, sought to establish.   16
 
Implied in the fourth hypothesis is the following question: how do trade ministers and 
ambassadors learn about the real underlying determinants of their trading partners' negotiating 
positions and the changes in them? A related question, borne more out of the author’s own 
suspicions than anything else, is whether there has been an over-reliance on face-to-face 
impressions gained between trade ministers, with insufficient attention being paid to the 
reports from officers or diplomats working in embassies and missions to foreign trading 
partners. 
 
For example, it would be interesting to understand why so many WTO members felt 
the European Union was able to give more concessions on agriculture in 2005, when a 
French-led coalition of the majority of European Union member States was firmly in place 
and which was publicly and repeatedly resisting attempts by the European Commission to 
offer more to trading partners. Interestingly, sometime towards the end of 2005 or during 
2006, this point appears to have been absorbed by Europe's trading partners; according to 
press reports, those trading partners had, by early 2007, apparently taken account of this 
coalition and had begun working with more reform-oriented European Union member States 
to persuade Germany to break with France on this matter (the ultimate goal being to isolate 
France and some other hold outs.) Whether this strategy was particularly well-timed in the run 
up to the French presidential election is another matter (a point that was unlikely to have been 
missed by the German Government), and may well account for little apparently coming of this 
particular initiative. The thinking, strategy and tactics employed, plus what they reveal about 
each major player’s understanding of other nations’ trade policy formation processes, are 
worthy of much more attention (although these matters may well appeal more to political 
scientists and international relations specialists than to economists). 
 
This section describes a number of research questions and problems that have arisen from the 
suspension of the Doha Round negotiations in July 2006. The sole purpose has been to 
emphasize that, in the light of relatively recent events, these questions and problems merit 
further attention, and not to suggest that no one has ever worked on these matters. Indeed, by 
answering these questions, we might gain a fuller picture of the political, economic and 




At present, the most optimistic predictions concerning the conclusion of the Doha 
Round point to the adoption of a modest package of trade reforms that will, to a large degree, 
consolidate prior trade reforms in a number of significant WTO members. It seems unlikely, 
then, that any Doha Round accord will be seen as a watershed agreement, as were the 
Uruguay Round accords. The question posed in this chapter concerns what we can learn from 
this latest attempt at multilateral trade liberalization and, in particular, in what ways will our 
understanding of the process of reciprocal trade liberalization need to be revised. The goal of 
this chapter is to sketch out what political, economic and diplomatic factors may need 
additional thought by researchers. 
 
In summary, this chapter argues that the following matters needed further 
consideration by scholars and international trade experts. Perhaps the most important question 
from the perspective of policy relevance is why do policy makers apparently perceive the cost 
of a suspended and possibly failed Doha Round to be so low? Questions have been raised 
with regard to how much value corporate interests actually place on bindings of tariffs etc.,   17
especially in an era when unilateral trade reforms have reduced applied tariff rates well below 
bound rates in many WTO member States. What factors account for the weight given to 
agricultural interests in the current trade round especially when national service sectors and 
the apparent benefits of service sector reform seem so large? What incentives are created by 
different negotiating procedures and which, if any, procedures are less susceptible to 
deadlock? Finally, in what ways and how effectively do the national trade policy makers learn 
about the factors underlying the negotiating positions of their trading partners? In addition to 
enriching our understanding of the process of multilateral trade negotiation and reform the 
answers to these questions could, in principle, have implications for policy-making as well as 
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